from farm to finished garment. The model has its critics. Some scholars argue the clusters risk replacing state control with private monopolies over the inputs on which farmers depend, such as seed, credit and machinery. But, crucially, rather than obstructing scrutiny, the government invited it. For nearly a decade, the ILO, working with the World Bank, monitored every harvest, interviewing thousands of pickers alongside local observers. In 2021, the harvest was found free of systemic child and forced labour, and in March 2022, at a press conference in Tashkent, the Cotton Campaign lifted its boycott, the outcome it had pursued for 15 years. WHY STATES, NOT JUST BRANDS Political economists have long argued that states are never mere bystanders to forced labour. By the way they govern labour markets, business and mobility, they decide whether unfree labour flourishes or disappears. Uzbekistan proves it works both ways: the state built the system, and only the state could dismantle it. The contrast with neighbouring Turkmenistan is instructive. Same crop, same Soviet inheritance, a similar state-run harvest, but in Turkmenistan a government that has refused independent monitoring and reform. The boycott of Turkmen cotton continues. The decisive variable is not the crop, nor the brands, but whether the state engages. This suggests anti-slavery efforts needs refocusing. Mainstream debate concentrates on brands – and brands matter – but where exploitation is rooted in state policy or weak labour law, accountability cannot simply be passed up the chain to buyers in London or New York. Governments and international bodies must engage producing countries directly: pressure where necessary, support in equal measure. In Uzbekistan, that meant tariff-free access to Europe under the EU’s GSP+ scheme (granted to countries that uphold labour and environmental conventions), plus ILO and World Bank engagement, German support through GIZ, and the Better Cotton programme. Pressure opened the door; partnerships helped the country through it. MADE IN UZBEKISTAN The results can be seen in the trade statistics. Uzbekistan cotton and textile exports reached around US$3.9 billion in 2023 from a sector that barely exported finished garments a decade ago, and the industry now employs roughly 600,000 people. International brands, among them Inditex, LC Waikiki and The North Face, have begun sourcing from Uzbek manufacturers. The cotton is still picked largely by hand, but by rural workers who choose the work at market wages, recruited by competing private employers rather than commanded by the state. Challenges remain, as with any emerging sourcing destination: building the skills, scale and reliability global buyers expect; deepening traceability; and developing genuine worker representation. Addressing these challenges is the work of years, not seasons, but they are the challenges of a normal industry, not of a forcedlabour state. REWRITING THE PLAYBOOK Within a decade, a practice that seemed immovable for 60 years became unthinkable, so much so that younger Uzbeks now struggle to believe it happened at all. That is the real significance of the case: forced labour was ended at scale not by adding more audits at the top of the supply chain, but by changing the politics at its base. In a world in which the ILO estimates almost 28 million people remain in forced labour, the question to ask is not only “what must brands do?” but “what will move the state?” Uzbekistan shows that with enough pressure and enough partnership the answer need never be nothing. FIFTY FOUR DEGREES | 49 Farmon Asadov is a PhD researcher in Operations and Supply Chain Management at Lancaster University Management School. His research examines how forced labour can be eradicated from global supply chains, focusing on the role of NGOs and other supply chain intermediaries in high-risk sourcing contexts. Before moving to Lancaster, he spent a decade working in the public sector and civil society in Bukhara, Uzbekistan. f.asadov@lancaster.ac.uk c.2020 state procurement quotas dismantled (cotton prices fully liberalised by 2023) 2021 harvest found free of systemic forced and child labour March 2022 boycott lifted 2023 zero raw cotton exports 2026 Better Cotton and organic production expanding c.2 million people (one in eight Uzbeks) mobilised for the harvest each autumn (ILO)
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